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Positions oﬀered on a labour market and workers preferences are
here described by bit-strings representing individual traits. We study
the co-evolution of workers and ﬁrm preferences modeled by such
traits. Individual ”size-like” properties are controlled by binary en-
counters which outcome depends upon a recognition process. De-
pending upon the parameter set-up, mutual selection of workers and
positions results in diﬀerent types of attractors, either an exclusive
niches regime or a competition regime.
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11 Introduction: hikers of the hyper-
cube
The study of dynamical systems most often concerns systems with few
degrees of freedom, or spatial systems. Physicists are less concerned
with other high dimensional systems. But many models in biology and
the social sciences are based on bit strings of often large dimensions.
If we take the case of biology and especially genomics, the genome
or the succession of monomers in biopolymers, is often represented by
a bit string. This is e.g. the case for models of the origin of life [1],
immunology [2], and of co-evolution [3].
These models are generally based on the following functional scheme:
Genome =⇒ recognition =⇒ action =⇒ results =⇒ population change.
The ”genome”, described by a bit string, undergoes selective en-
counters with other genomes and some action with more or less suc-
cessful results inﬂuences a death and/or ”birth” process.
These models also inspired social sciences: Cultural and opinion
dynamics have been described by [4, 5]. The minority game [6] applies
to ﬁnance. Finally the genetic algorithm approach [7] has a wide range
of applications ranging from co-evolution to optimisation.
All these algorithms have in common the bit-string description and
most often a recognition process, but they diﬀer by the consequences
of signiﬁcant encounters, as stressed by the well known title in psy-
chology: ”What do you do after your say Hello?”[8] .
The present model is built along the above lines. It straightfor-
wardly applies to a labour market with positions oﬀered by ﬁrms and
workers looking for positions. The qualiﬁcations required by the posi-
tion and its characteristics can be described in a ﬁrst approximation
by a bit string: the position could for instance be described not only
by a salary, but also by working conditions, required qualiﬁcations,
social advantages and so on. On the other hand, each job seeker can
also be described by her requirements in terms of salary, working con-
ditions etc. The here proposed bit-string approach diﬀers from more
standard models of the job market [9],[10], based on adjustment of
salaries and workers requirements; our model might be more appro-
priate to a labour market for professionals who also care about features
other than salary.
2Let us consider a set of job seekers looking for positions which
characteristics are described by bit strings. We here simplify by con-
sidering binary, independent characteristics.
The preferences of workers i depend upon the overlap qij of their







Where the symbol EQ stands for the logical equivalence relation,
which gives 1 if the two bits are equal and 0 otherwise. The recog-
nition condition is that the overlap is larger than a ﬁxed threshold.
Encounters, position ﬁlling and generated proﬁts (or losses) inﬂuence
integrated continuous variables which control the persistence of the
agents on the labour market. Our model, to be completely deﬁned in
the next section, then deﬁnes a co-evolution dynamics of workers and
positions.
We are interested in the dynamics of population of agents on the
string hypercube and in the stable patterns that may arise. We want
to know how these patterns depend upon the parameters of the model:
what are the diﬀerent regimes, where are their transitions.
The model is based on a workers/positions co-evolution but it can
also be applied to other domains, provided some degree of adjust-
ments. One can think of other markets, such as production/consumption
markets (as in [11]). In political science, one could model the co-
evolution of political party platforms and voter choices as described
by bit strings; each bit is now the position of the party (or the voter)
on some speciﬁc issue, Europe, retirement policy, environment etc.
Such applications can be very concrete. A major car constructor
can in principle provide a lot of options: their combination would
correspond to more than ten thousands diﬀerent cars. But not all
combinations would sell well; furthermore each change on the produc-
tion chain has a cost. The issue for the producers is which combination
of options should I propose to the public in view of its distribution of
preferences. The same issue is faced by the local dealer: which stock
of combinations should I keep available to the local public?
2 The Model
In the model there are Np ﬁrm agents and Nc worker agents. Each
worker prefers a (possibly unavailable) position which characteristics
3are coded by a ”requirement” string of k bits. Each ﬁrm oﬀers posi-
tions which characteristics are also coded by a string of k bits. The
bit string of a worker represents what the worker agent requests and
the bit string of the ﬁrm is a code for the position that it proposes.
In addition to the two bit strings that code for requirements and
position, the ”wealth” of each agent is deﬁned by a scalar variable S
or C, depending upon the agent type (worker or ﬁrm, respectively).
The variable Si represents the degree of satisfaction of the worker i
and Cj represents the capital accumulated by ﬁrm j.
In economy this role is played by money, but in other contexts it
could be power or status.
The dynamics of the model is described by:
A recognition and position ﬁlling process.
At each time step, all workers look for positions closest to their
requirements set (the position string with the largest overlap qij; in
the case of equality among several positions a random choice is made
among them). If the relative overlap
qij
k between the position and the
worker strings is larger than a threshold θ, the position is ﬁlled by the
worker whose satisfaction is changed according to:
Si(t + 1) = Si(t) − ac +
qij
k (2)
Satisfaction is increased according the relative overlap of the require-
ment and position strings. It is decreased by ac representing a con-
stant individual eﬀort made by the worker. The satisfaction of those
workers who don’t ﬁnd accptable positions are simply decreased by
ac.
The equivalent updating of the ﬁrm capital is:





Capital is increased by the set of ﬁlled positions during the time in-
terval, according the relative overlaps of the requirement and position
strings (workers productivity relates to the overlap). Capital is de-
creased by a constant labour and investment cost ap.
A Persistence and renewal process.
There is no upper limit to worker satisfaction or to ﬁrm capital.
But due to the costs terms, ap and ac, they may decrease to zero.
A ﬁrm which capital would become negative quits the market and
is not renewed.
On the opposite, a worker which satisfaction would become nega-
tive leaves the market and is replaced by a new worker, with a constant
4initial satisfaction S0 and a randomly generated requirement string:
we suppose that there exist diﬀerent labour markets, say in diﬀerent
cities. Our model applies to the dynamics of one local market. Any
unsatisﬁed worker moves to another city. The departures from our lo-
cal market are balanced by inﬂux of workers unsatisﬁed in other cities
which look for new opportunities in the local market.
Both assumptions are simpliﬁcations. Firms might want to ﬁll
diﬀerent kind of positions: we here assume that positions of a single
kind are the most crucial for the survival of the ﬁrm. Firms might
evolve by adaptation or new ﬁrms might appear on a given market.
Adaptation is discussed in another report [11], but the present simpler
model simply supposes that workers turnover and ﬁrm selection are
faster processes than ﬁrm creation and adaptation.
3 Checking the parameter space
In principle there are eight independent parameters:
• The string length k and the threshold θ for interaction.
• The constants ap and ac.
• The initial numbers of ﬁrms (Np) and workers (Nc).
• The initial endowments of ﬁrms (Cp) and workers (Sc).
In practice, because of the irreversibility of the ﬁrms removal pro-
cess, Cp and Np inﬂuence mostly the early stages of the dynamics.
In terms of dynamical regimes and transitions, we might expect
that the most important parameters are ac and θ (since we keep k
constant).
In equation 1, the positive term θ
k is between 0 and 1. Then, for
large values of ac, ac larger than 1, the change in worker satisfaction is
negative. Workers dynamics is characterised by a renewal process of
workers, with a rate of order Sc
ac: workers are created with S = Sc, and
their satisfaction can only linearly decrease to zero when they quit.
On average their satisfaction is S = Sc/2. ac = 1 is then the critical
value of the satisfaction parameter separating the regime where some
workers may increase their satisfaction with time and remain locally
employed, from a renewal regime when all workers are condemned to
nomadism across diﬀerent labour markets.
The threshold for interaction θ ﬁxes a basin of satisfaction in the
neighborhood of the ﬁrm, which size is given by the number of sites
5ns(θ) which Hamming distance to the oﬀered position string is less or
equal to k −θ. Any worker whose string is in the basin of satisfaction
of a ﬁrm may interact and take the position. For k = 10, θ = 1 gives
a neighbourhood of size 1, size 11 for θ = 0.9, size 56 for θ = 0.8 etc.
Comparing ns(θ)×Np to 2k = 1024, the number of sites on the hyper-
cube, gives an approximation of the condition in threshold separating
the competition regime at low θ values, from the ”niche” regime. In
the competition regime, workers may choose between diﬀerent ﬁrms
in their neighborhood; ﬁrms then compete for workers. In the niche
regime, they are so far apart that they don’t compete.
In the competition regime, according to ap values, we might pre-
dict that competition will reduce a too large initial number of ﬁrms,
until they get closer to the critical number where the niche regime is
established. But according to initial conditions, essentially Cp and Np,
the selection of surviving ﬁrms may end up in a variety of attractors
as shown by simulations. Anyway, a maximum number of ﬁrms sur-
viving on the local market in the competition regime can be estimated










These equations are based on an approximation of uniform distribu-
tion of position strings on the hypercube. On average each ﬁrm is
surrounded by Nc
Np workers which contribute to its capital balance.
We will further observe that this upper bound is seldom reached.
4 Simulation results
Most simulations were made for a ﬁxed set of parameters: String
length k = 10, ﬁrms cost constant ap = 4.5, number of workers
(Nc=1000) and initial endowments of ﬁrms (Cp = 200) and work-
ers (Sc = 5). Simulation times were usually 2000, but we checked that
the stationary regime was reached by increasing simulation times up
to 10000.
We studied the inﬂuence of workers eﬀort constant ac, threshold θ
and Np, the initial number of ﬁrms.
64.1 Time evolution
Let us ﬁrst monitor the time evolution of ﬁrms capital Ci, of the aver-
age worker satisfaction S, of workers renewal rate and of the number
of surviving ﬁrms.
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Figure 1: Time evolution of ﬁrms capital Ci, of the average worker satisfac-
tion S, of workers renewal rate and of the number of surviving ﬁrms. Np
initial was 30, Nc = 1000, ac = 1, Cp = 200, θ = .9.
In ﬁgure 1, where Np initial was 30, Nc = 1000, ac = 1, θ = .9, we
see on the lower right curve that ﬁrms are ﬁrst selected: there number
is decreased from 30 to 11, and then business becomes proﬁtable (C
evolution, on the upper left curves). The early ﬁrm selection gives
ﬁgures much lower than the upper bound computed by equation 3
(which should be around 200), but surviving ﬁrms make proﬁt.
Workers average satisfaction is always lower than 5: since ac = 1
no worker ever increases satisfaction, but the random generation of
arriving workers allow some of them, ”the condensed” workers, to
reach the cell of one ﬁrm where they may survive for ever. Average S
7reﬂects the division between a fraction f of condensed workers with
S = 5 and of unsatisﬁed workers with average S = 2.5. f then obeys:
f × 5 + (1 − f) × 2.5 =< S > (5)
f =
< S > −2.5
2.5
(6)
The increase of < S > towards 5 with time then reﬂects the increase of
the fraction of ”condensed” workers towards 1. This eﬀect is conﬁrmed
by decrease of the renewal rate on the lower left plot.
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Figure 2: Time evolution of ﬁrms capital Ci, of the average worker satis-
faction S, of worker renewal rate and of the number of surviving ﬁrms. Np
initial was 30,Nc = 1000, θ = .9, Cp = 200, as on the previous ﬁgure but the
worker’s eﬀort constant is now ac = 0.9 instead of 1.
With ac = 0.9, smaller than one, those condensed workers in the
neighborhood of the ﬁrms can even increase satisfaction during their
inﬁnite lifetime as observed on the right upper corner. Because of the
8lower stress on workers, they early ﬁnd spots where they are able to
survive, and they stabilize in the neighborhood of ﬁrms much earlier
in time. The diversity of ﬁrms is higher: 17 survive.
4.2 Attractors
Let us now do a systematic study of the attractors of the dynamics.
We checked the asymptotic state of the system through a similar set of
variables: ﬁrms capital Ci, average worker satisfaction < S >, number
of surviving ﬁrms.
We also tried to characterise the degree of order or of diversity of
the attractor conﬁguration and used the overlap of workers require-
ment strings as the order function. This is the same notion as used in
spin glass theory. We then checked the fraction
h(10)
h(5) of the histogram
of overlaps among workers requirement strings. This gives us an in-
dication about how many workers are condensed and what is their
repartition (even or uneven) in the neighborhood of ﬁrms.
In the next four ﬁgures, the horizontal variable is Np the initial
number of ﬁrms. The four sets of ﬁgures correspond to two values of
θ, 09 and 0.8, and ac, 0.9 and 1. These results were averaged over 100
diﬀerent random samplings of initial conﬁgurations.
There is not much to add about the inﬂuence ac from these ﬁgures.
But the inﬂuence of θ on the transition between a competition regime
(θ = .8) and a niche regime (θ = .9) is now made clear.
In the niche regime, θ = .9, few ﬁrms survive, even for large initial
numbers of ﬁrms (ﬁgure 3). Their number saturates around 20 for
higher values of the initial ﬁrm number. Firms make a lot of proﬁt
(large C values) (ﬁgure 4). Workers satisfaction depends upon ac (ﬁg-
ure 5). Signiﬁcant values of h(10), corresponding mostly to workers
which requirement string is exactly a seller position string, are ob-
served when ac and θ are both large.
On ﬁgure 6, the large value of the 10 overlap bin observed when
ac = 1 and θ = .9 is an indication that many workers have the same
requirement string. This concentration of requirement strings, co-
occurring with small number of surviving ﬁrms, is obviously due to
their ”condensation” on ﬁrms position strings. Furthermore, the large
overlap value of 0.2 observed for ac = 1 and θ = 0.9 tells us that
their distribution among diﬀerent ﬁrms is uneven; an even distribution
would correspond to the inverse number of surviving ﬁrms, 0.05.





















































Figure 3: Number of surviving ﬁrms. These are taken at time=2000. Np, the
initial number of ﬁrms is varied along the x axis (logarithmic scale). Each of
the four plots correspond to a given pair of ac and θ values, upper plots to a
threshold θ = 0.8 lower plots to a threshold θ = 0.9, left plots to consumption




















































Figure 4: Averaged ﬁrm capital Ci at time=2000. Np is varied along the x
axis (logarithmic scale). Each of the four plots correspond to a given pair of



















































Figure 5: Average worker satisfaction S at time=2000. Np is varied along
the x axis (logarithmic scale). Each of the four plots correspond to a given
pair of ac and θ values, upper plots to a threshold θ = 0.8 lower plots to
a threshold θ = 0.9, left plots to consumption ac = 1 and right plots to





















































































Figure 6: Relative size of the condensed fraction (
h(10)
h(5) ) of workers; namely
those workers whose requirements ﬁt exactly the characteristics of the oﬀered
positions. Np is varied along the x axis (logarithmic scale).
13number, and similar observations on workers clearly demonstrate two
phases of the dynamics at least when ac < 1 and θ is suﬃciently large.
• An initial transient period, during which those workers which are
not close enough to ﬁrms quit. An equivalent selection process
occurs for ﬁrms which are selected against when workers are not
dense enough in their neighborhood to support their economic
activity.
• A stationary period, following the selection period. During this
period, workers get jobs and ﬁrm capital increases. Depending
upon workers eﬀort constant ac, their satisfaction may increase
when ac < 1 or saturate when ac = 1. Depending upon the
threshold for recognition θ, two distinct stationary regimes are
observed:
– A niche regime when workers condensate close to ﬁrms, at
lower ﬁrm density and higher threshold values.
– A competition regime when ﬁrms compete for workers, at
higher ﬁrm density and lower threshold values.
4.3 Patterns on the hypercube
Further observations show that the selection process does not give rise
to uniform densities of workers and ﬁrms on the hypercube: this pro-
cess is spatially unstable. When a region is depleted say in workers,
the density of ﬁrms is also depleted, and a further depletion of work-
ers also occurs. As a result the selection process goes much further in
reducing the number of ﬁrms that equation 3 would suggest; surviving
ﬁrms then make proﬁt and the histogram of their Hamming distance
is biased towards the bins lower than 5 (which would correspond to a
random distribution), as observed on ﬁgure 7. This ﬁgure which repre-
sent the result of 100 simulations was taken under severe constraints,
ap = 10 and Cp = 1000, but the number of surviving ﬁrms is much
less than the prediction of equation 3 (100). Firm strings concentrate
in a small region of the hypercube, as observe on the histogram of dis-
tances, and by direct examination of the position strings (not shown
here).
The initial dynamics of accumulation of workers in the satisfaction
basin of the survivors displayed on ﬁgure 8 lower right panel com-
fort our hypotheses. One observes a strong population increase in
the satisfaction basin of the surviving ﬁrms and a slow decay in the






































Figure 7: Instability of the ﬁrm selection process. The histogram of the num-
ber of surviving ﬁrms on the upper diagram was obtained for 100 runs. It
displays a strong reduction from initial ﬁrm number, Np = 20, with large de-
viations. The lower histogram displays relative distances among ﬁrm strings,
and shows that they are concentrated in only a small part of the hypercube
(randomly dispersed ﬁrms would give a maximum at 0.5).
15neighborhood of the opposite strings (the random initial population
of any 2-neighbourhood is 56 on average). Two growth regimes are
observed. The initial population increase (during the ﬁrst 100 time
steps) is due to the fact that any site on the 2-neighbourhood of a
ﬁrm has a much longer persistence time than those in the desert (the
desert persistence time is 5). Close to the ﬁrms the persistence time is
inﬁnite at 0 distance, 50 at distance 1, 25 at distance 2. Newly arrived
workers (1/5) have a 1000/56 chance to get to an attraction basin of
a surviving ﬁrm, which gives the observed ﬁgure of 100 time steps for
the steep increase duration. Later the slow growth correspond to the
replacement of workers in the attraction basin by those who hit the
ﬁrm site and thus eternity.
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Figure 8: Time evolution of ﬁrms capital Ci, of the average worker satisfac-
tion S, of workers renewal rate and of the number of workers in the attraction
basin of the two surviving ﬁrms (rising curves) and of two random sites. Np
initial was 20,Nc = 1000, ac = 1, θ = 1. The large value of ap = 10 gives rise
to a strong selection of ﬁrms.
165 Conclusions
The main conclusions of this admittedly crude model is that according
to parameter values, and especially the threshold for recruitment, the
worker eﬀort cost and ﬁrm density, two diﬀerent asymptotic regimes
can be observed:
• A very stable niche regime, with workers whose preferences are
closely aligned to the characteristics of the positions oﬀered by
ﬁrms. This regime is observed at lower ﬁrm density and higher
threshold values.
• The competition regime where ﬁrms compete for workers is less
rigid. It is observed at higher ﬁrm density and lower threshold.
The model in its simplest version was applied to a local labour
market exchanging unsatisﬁed workers with external markets. Several
generalisations are possible to other markets. We could for instance
think of retail markets with shops and consumers looking for goods.
Such business is often made in the US in malls. The equivalent in-
terpretation of our model would then be in terms of shops (instead of
ﬁrms), products (instead of positions), malls (instead of local markets)
consumers (instead of workers) etc.
An interesting generalisation is to give strategic evolution capaci-
ties to ﬁrms, or learning abilities to workers searching positions. The
line of research of co-evolution when ﬁrms are endowed with strategic
behaviour has already been investigated by [11]. We can predict from
our present study that ﬁrms strategies may be inﬂuential and provide
higher gains in the competition regime. On the opposite when the
niche regime is established their eﬃciency will be extremely limited
because of the condensation of workers in the neighbourhood of ﬁrms.
These predictions are conﬁrmed by the simulations done in reference
[11].
In other words, the present study has set the stage for more intri-
cate studies in co-evolution.
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